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I. INTRODUCTION 
Wicked Weed Brewing Company opened its doors in 2012 to a thriving North 
Carolina craft beer scene, and it grew like a weed.1 In 2014, Wicked Weed 
introduced the Funkatorium—a  popular taproom and barrel-aging facility.2 The 
following year, the brewery opened a third production facility, which included a 
40,000 square foot, 50-barrel brewhouse.3 To put that number into perspective, this 
facility alone is capable of brewing 1,550 gallons of beer in a single batch.4 Then 
in 2016, Wicked Weed opened a 57,000 square foot brewery and barrelhouse built 
on 17 acres; the company’s largest facility.5 After opening four production 
facilities in less than five years, the brewery employed over 200 workers6 and 
produced over 150 unique beers a year.7 Wicked Weed’s creations have won 
numerous awards in notable tasting competitions,8 and the brewery itself won the 
title of best craft brewery in North Carolina and in the 17-state South.9 
In May 2017, Wicked Weed announced what it called a “strategic partnership” 
with The High End, a division of the Belgian beer giant Anheuser-Busch InBev 
(“AB InBev”).10 In other words, “Wicked Weed sold out to a Big Brewery.”11 
Why would a wildly successful craft brewery decide to sell to a large 
corporation?12 Looking at the beer industry as a whole, the trend is not an 
uncommon one.13 In fact, by 2018 Wicked Weed was the tenth craft brewery 
 
1.  Press Release, Anheuser-Busch, Wicked Weed Brings Flavor and Funk to the High End (May 3, 2017), 
http://www.anheuser-busch.com/newsroom/2017/05/wicked-weed.html (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
2.  Jane Lothrop, Wicked Weed to Build Fourth Production Facility, BREWBOUND (Mar. 17, 2016, 11:09 
AM), https://www.brewbound.com/news/wicked-weed-to-build-fourth-production-facility (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
3.  Id. 
4.  See Defining a Brewery by Barrels, KALISPELL BREWING CO., http://kalispellbrewing.com/wp/definin 
g-a-brewery-by-barrels/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(explaining one barrel contains 31 gallons of beer). 
5.  Lothrop, supra note 2. 
6.  Travis M. Andrews, ‘Treachery’: Craft Brewery Wicked Weed Enrages Fans by Partnering with Big 
Beer, CHI. TRIB. (May 5, 2017, 11:38 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-wicked-weed-inbev-
backlash-20170505-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
7.  Chris Furnari, Anheuser-Busch to Purchase Wicked Weed Brewing, BREWBOUND (May 3, 2017, 9:35 
AM), https://www.brewbound.com/news/anheuser-busch-purchase-wicked-weed-brewing (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
8.  Id. 
9.  Andrews, supra note 6. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. 
12.  See id. (explaining Wicked Weed’s rapid success and subsequent sale). 
13.  Matt Allyn, Is That Really Craft Beer? 33 Surprising Corporate Brewers, MEN’S JOURNAL, 
http://www.mensjournal.com/food-drink/drinks/is-that-really-craft-beer-21-surprising-corporate-brewers-
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acquired by AB InBev since 2011.14 Other notable transactions include Big Beer 
conglomerate Constellation Brands’ 2015 acquisition of Ballast Point Brewing 
Company for the eye-popping price tag of one-billion dollars,15 and Lagunitas 
Brewing Company’s 2015 sale of half of its ownership interest to Dutch brewer 
Heineken.16 Then in May 2017, coinciding with the Wicked Weed-AB InBev 
transaction, Heineken bought Lagunitas’ remaining interest to take 100% 
ownership of the company.17 These horizontal transactions, where one brewery 
purchases interest in another brewery, are part of the recent consolidation of the 
beer market.18 
With the assistance of the alcohol industry’s legal framework, Big Beer is 
smothering its craft brewery competitors.19 The United States’ legal system for 
alcohol distribution, commonly called the “three-tier system,” and beer franchise 
laws are antiquated and allow Big Beer to influence marketplace access.20 
Unfortunately, the three-tier system often places craft breweries at a disadvantage 
because small breweries lack the resources of their larger counterparts.21 As noted 
by associates of craft breweries whom have chosen to partner with Big Beer, 
successful craft breweries looking to grow and expand to other geographic  
markets effectively have only one option—join Big Beer.22 The obvious route, 
selling ownership interests to Big Beer, provides craft breweries with the resources 
they need to grow, such as access to ingredients, equipment, and a wider 
distribution area.23 While these partnerships may be beneficial for the handful of 
 
20150923 (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (listing 33 popular 
craft brewery mergers and acquisitions by Big Beer companies). 
14.  Furnari, supra note 7 (providing the other AB InBev craft beer acquisitions are Goose Island, Blue 
Point, Brewing, 10 Barrel Brewing, Elysian Brewing, Golden Road, Breckenridge Brewery, Four Peaks Brewing, 
Devil’s Backbone, and Karbach Brewing). 
15.  Peter Rowe, Ballast Point to be Sold to N.Y. Corporation for $1B, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Nov. 16, 
2015, 8:51 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/entertainment/beer/sdut-ballast-point-sold-corona-
constellation-brands-2015nov16-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
18.  PHILIP H. HOWARD, TOO BIG TO ALE? GLOBALIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION IN THE BEER INDUSTRY 
1 (2013), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2268705 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(explaining that Big Beer has grown from less than 50% of total sales in 2005 to over 70% in 2012). 
19.  Michael Kiser, Critical Drinking—On Breaking Up “Ma Beer” and The Three Tier, GOOD BEER 
HUNTING (Aug. 31, 2017), http://goodbeerhunting.com/blog/2017/8/30/critical-drinking-breaking-up-ma-beer-
and-the-three-tier (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
20.  Id. 
21.  Marc Sorini, Understanding the Three-Tier System: Its Impacts on U.S. Craft Beer and You, CRAFT 
BEER.COM (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.craftbeer.com/craft-beer-muses/three-tier-system-impacts-craft-beer (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
22.  Kate Taylor, People Are Furious That This Craft Brewer ‘Sold Out’ to Anheuser Busch—Here’s Why 
the Founders Say They’re Wrong, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 3, 2017, 5:03 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/wicked-weed-founders-take-on-sell-out-criticism-2017-5 (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining from the owners’ perspective that the transaction was an 
opportunity for growth of craft beer, not inhibition). 
23.  Id. 
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Big Beer-owned craft breweries, they come to the market at the cost of fair 
competition, consumer choice, and product variety.24 
To improve competition and promote variety in the marketplace, regulators 
must amend the existing alcohol regulatory system to match the current market.25 
Although three-tier distribution is an imperfect legal system, it is a necessary 
regulation and safeguards against legitimate competition concerns, namely a 
complete Big Beer takeover.26 To solve the issue of large-scale market 
consolidation, craft brewers should first look to the federal government to help 
protect the craft beer industry by closely scrutinizing horizontal transactions under 
an antitrust analysis.27 After reducing market consolidation, regulations should 
focus on creating a true independent distribution tier28 and reconsidering current 
beer franchise laws.29 
Part II of this Comment attempts to define  “craft” beer and the values of the 
culture that are threatened by market consolidation.30 Part III reviews the history 
behind regulations in the beer market, and the development of the three-tier alcohol 
distribution system and beer franchise laws.31 Part IV examines  how current 
regulations affect the craft beer industry and shape the relationships between the 
tiers.32  In light of the growing concerns of a monopoly on the craft beer market, 
Part V discusses antitrust actions in the craft beer industry and how scrutinizing 
future brewery acquisitions under an antitrust analysis will help protect the 
market.33 Part VI then suggests further changes to alcohol regulation that will 
prevent consolidation and promote variety and consumer choice.34 
II. THE CRAFT BEER MARKET 
The Brewer’s Association defines craft breweries as “small, independent and 
traditional.”35 “Small” means that the brewery produces less than six million 
barrels of beer annually.36 “Independent” refers to the restriction that a craft 
 
24.  Dan Croxall, Let’s Make Sure We Are Talking About the Same Things: Tied-House Laws the Three-
Tier System, CRAFT BEER L. PROF (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.craftbeerprofessor.com/2017/02/lets-make-sure-
talking-things-tied-house-laws-three-tier-system/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
25.  See id. (explaining that without laws, the market would unfavorably benefit large corporations). 
26.  Kiser, supra note 19.  
27.  Infra Part V. 
28.  Infra Part VI.A. 
29.  Infra Part VI.B. 
30.  Infra Part II. 
31.  Infra Part III. 
32.  Infra Part IV. 
33.  Infra Part V. 
34.  Infra Part VI. 
35.  CANDACE L. MOON & STACY ALLURA HOSTETTER, BREW LAW 101: A LEGAL GUIDE TO OPENING A 
BREWERY—CALIFORNIA EDITION 1 (Paula L. Fleming & Doug McNair eds., 2015). 
36.  Id. 
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brewery may not have greater than 25% ownership by another industry member.37 
“Traditional” means that breweries produce the majority of their beer from 
traditional ingredients.38 While the Brewer’s Association has set forth a technical 
definition, the hallmark of craft beer is the culture of innovation, collaboration, and 
community.39 
The craft beer culture is the foundation of the industry, and the values that craft 
beer embodies are important to both the industry and its patrons.40 AB InBev’s 
acquisition of Wicked Weed garnered widespread notoriety and disdain because 
the large corporation’s values run counter to the craft culture.41 Many, both inside 
and outside of the craft beer industry, wrote articles criticizing the transaction and 
questioning what it meant for the craft beer market.42 As a testament to this 
disapproval, over 50 of the 70 craft breweries scheduled to attend Wicked Weed’s 
annual Funkatorium Invitational tasting competition withdrew, forcing Wicked 
Weed to postpone the competition indefinitely.43 
From 2015 to 2016, the number of craft breweries in the United States 
increased by over 16% to an all-time high of 5,234.44 Craft breweries’ total dollar 
share of the domestic beer market, at just under 22%, was also at an all-time high 
at the close of 2016—and Big Beer noticed.45 The five largest brewers in America 
account for nearly 80% of the market share, and Big Beer companies are actively 
looking to become more involved in the craft beer sector.46 Anheuser-Busch alone 
possesses a domestic market share of over 40 percent.47 The backlash from the 
Wicked Weed acquisition demonstrates that people are beginning to notice Big 
 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. at 2 (listing the four traditional ingredients of beer are water, hops, malt, and yeast). 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Carol Viau, AB InBev Scoops Up Asheville’s Wicked Weed: Purchase Leaves Craft Beer Lovers in 
Dismay, THE MOUNTAINEER (May 7, 2017), https://www.themountaineer.com/news/business/ab-inbev-scoops-
up-asheville-s-wicked-weed/article_a4bb06a8-336b-11e7-9644-5b594557e797.html (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
42.  Compare id., with Taylor, supra note 22 (explaining a selling brewery owner’s response to social 
backlash). 
43.  Press Release, Funkatorium Invitational (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.wickedweedbrewing.com/funkatorium-invitational-update/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review).  
44.  Press Release, Brewer’s Association, Steady Growth for Small and Independent Brewers (Mar. 28, 
2017), https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/2016-growth-small-independent-brewers/ (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
45.  Id. 
46.  Alastair Bland, Craft Beer, Brought to You by Big Beer, NPR (July 28, 2017, 12:03 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/07/28/539760477/craft-beer-brought-to-you-by-big-beer (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review); Industry Fast Facts, NAT’L BEER WHOLESALERS ASS’N, 
https://www.nbwa.org/resources/industry-fast-facts (last visited Apr. 8, 2018) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
47.  Industry Fast Facts, supra note 46. 
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Beer conglomerates’ attempts to capitalize on the rising popularity of craft beer.48 
While no definitive monopoly over the beer market currently exists, many 
people believe it is a near monopoly, or headed in that direction.49 One article even 
goes so far as to dub Big Beer companies “Ma Beer,” a nod to the AT&T monopoly 
over the telecommunications sector popularized as “Ma Bell.”50  “Ma Bell” was 
later dismantled through antitrust measures, and the article suggests a similar 
application to Ma Beer.51 Another news site prefaced its article on the recent 
consolidation of the beer market with a graphic depicting Monopoly mascot Rich 
Uncle Pennybags (representing Big Beer) standing on a tap handle holding bags of 
money with his hat placed on every tap handle.52 The federal government seems to 
share the same sentiment; the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
recently examined Anheuser-Busch’s motives in light of their merger with 
SABMiller, the company that brews Coors.53 The DOJ required notice of and 
promised to scrutinize any future Anheuser-Busch craft brewery acquisitions.54 
Although the craft beer market has continued to grow, the trend towards 
consolidation and monopolization of the market threatens craft breweries and the 
craft beer culture.55 
III. THE REGULATION OF ALCOHOL 
The current landscape for alcohol regulation began forming with the passage 
of the Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which ended 
Prohibition.56 The regulations that have formed since Prohibition act together to 
hinder the growth of the modern craft beer market.57 Changes in the dominant 
paradigm over decades of brewing without the equivalent shift in the regulatory 
framework have resulted in a system where manufacturing rights and relationships 
 
48.  Bland, supra note 46 (describing Big Beer’s buy-out of craft breweries and squeeze-out of the 
distribution industry). 
49.  See generally Kiser, supra note 19; Adam Davidson, Are We in Danger of a Beer Monopoly?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/magazine/beer-mergers.html (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the recent trends in the American beer market towards a 
monopoly). 
50.  Kiser, supra note 19.  
51.  Id.  
52.  Dave Infante, The Great Craft Beer Sellout, THRILLIST (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.thrillist.com/dri 
nk/nation/craft-breweries-selling-out-big-beer-companies (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
53.  Diane Bartz, Exclusive, U.S. Queries AB InBev On Distribution Incentives and Merger Probe, 
REUTERS (May 24, 2016, 10:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-a-b-i-craftbeers-probe-
exclusive/exclusive-u-s-queries-ab-inbev-on-distribution-incentives-amid-merger-probe-idUSKCN0YG0EG 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
54.  Kiser, supra note 19. 
55.  Brian D. Anhalt, Crafting a Model State Law for Today’s Beer Industry, 21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 162, 190 (2016). 
56.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
57.  Kiser, supra note 19.  
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are used to stifle and overpower craft breweries.58 Section A explains the history 
behind alcohol regulation that led to the dominant three-tier distribution system 
and how it functions today.59 Section B details the history of the enactment of beer 
franchise laws and their effect on the beer industry.60 
A. The Three-Tiered Distribution System 
 Subsection 1 describes the origins and implementation of the three-tier 
system.61 Subsection 2 elaborates on the role of each of the tiers in the system.62 
1. Roots of the Three-Tier System 
The Eighteenth Amendment, which instituted Prohibition, was rooted in the 
temperance movement.63 The temperance movement sought to legally limit or 
proscribe alcohol consumption based on the idea that alcohol “spawned a multitude 
of social, political, and economic evils.”64 The movement particularly targeted 
tied-houses, a common distribution scheme of the pre-Prohibition era.65 
“Tied-house” is the term for a retailer that is controlled by an alcohol 
manufacturer, either through direct ownership or exclusive contract agreements.66 
The tied-house system led to a distribution structure where the producer controlled 
both the production and sale of beer, which resulted in  numerous bars, each 
exclusively serving only the controlling producer’s alcohol.67 These bars and pubs 
competed for business by lowering prices and offering other incentives to drink at 
their bars, which promoted a culture of overconsumption.68 In 1920, the 
Prohibition banned the production and sale of alcohol in the United States, and 
tied-houses faded.69 
 
58.  Id. 
59.  Infra Part III.A. 
60.  Infra Part III.B. 
         61. Infra Part III.A.1. 
         62. Infra Part III.A.2. 
63.  GARRETT PECK, THE PROHIBITION HANGOVER: ALCOHOL IN AMERICA FROM DEMON RUM TO CULT 
CABERNET 9 (2009). 
64.  DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 8 (2d ed. 2000). 
65.   Ryan R. Lee, Prohibition’s Hangover: How Antiquated Illinois Beer-Law is Abused by Big Beer to 
the Substantial Detriment of Craft Breweries, 37 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 144, 149–50 (2016). 
66.  Tim Heffernan, Last Call: Industry Giants Are Threatening to Swallow up America’s Carefully 
Regulated Alcohol Industry, and Remake America in the Image of Booze-Soaked Britain, WASH. MONTHLY (Nov. 
2012), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/novdec-2012/last-call/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
67.  Id.  
68. See id. (explaining that some bars would also offer gambling or prostitution as an incentive to attract 
customers). 
69.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; Lee, supra note 65, at 150.  
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After a tumultuous few years where alcohol was prohibited but remained 
prevalent in society,70 the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933 
ended the Prohibition.71 Although the Prohibition was largely unsuccessful, some 
semblance of the temperance movement remained, and Congress sought to avoid 
the under-regulated and profit-driven system that led to the Prohibition.72 
The first section of the Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Prohibition, 
while the second banned “[t]he transportation or importation into any State, 
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of 
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof.”73 The second section allotted 
states the power to regulate the transportation, importation, and use of alcohol.74 
To avoid returning to the pre-Prohibition system, the federal government and every 
state has passed some variation of a tied-house law that prohibits common 
ownership interest between brewers and retailers.75 The majority of states have 
opted for the strongest protection against tied-houses by adopting the three-tier 
distribution system.76 
2. The Three Tiers 
In its pure form, three-tier distribution is the ultimate separation of the retailer 
from the producer.77 The three-tier system separates the alcohol market into three 
distinct categories, or “tiers”: producers, wholesalers, and retailers.78 As producers, 
brewers may only manufacture and package their beers.79 Wholesalers are the 
distributors who contract with producers to sell their products to retailers.80 
Retailers then sell the products to consumers.81 Instituting the distributors as an 
independent middleman either limits or eliminates the producers’ involvement and 
interest in retailers, and severely curtails the ability of brewers to assist or 
incentivize the lower two-tiers.82 The strict separation of the three tiers helps avoid 
 
70.  PECK, supra note 63, at 13–14 (explaining that Americans continued to drink alcohol after the 18th 
Amendment, and Prohibition gave rise to organized crime in order to supply that alcohol). 
71.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. 
72.  Andrew D’Aversa, Brewing Better Law: Two Proposals to Encourage Innovation in America’s Craft 
Beer Industry, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1465, 1473 (2017). 
73.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
74.  Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484 (2005) (“The aim of the Twenty-First Amendment was to allow 
States to maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling liquor by regulating its transportation, 
importation, and use.”). 
75.  Justin M. Welch, The Inevitability of the Brewpub: Legal Avenues for Expanding Distribution 
Capabilities, 16 REV. LITIG. 173, 178 (1997). 
76.  D’Aversa, supra note 72. 
77.  Id. at 1475. 
78.  Sorini, supra note 21. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id.  
81.  Id.  
82.  Id.  
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overconsumption and other tied-house evils of the pre-Prohibition paradigm.83 
B. Beer Franchise Laws 
Beer franchise laws that act in concert with the three-tier distribution system 
are key developments that have created a lasting impact on the craft beer industry.84 
Franchise laws regulate the contractual relationship between the distribution and 
production tiers.85 Like the three-tier distribution system, beer franchise laws 
require some historical context to understand their role in the craft beer industry.86 
In the 1970s, state legislatures created beer franchise statutes to compensate 
for an imbalance in bargaining power when the market was dominated by a handful 
of large breweries interacting with numerous small distributors.87 States designed 
these statutes for a national market with less than 50 brewers and over 5,000 
distributors,88 in stark contrast to the over 8,000 permitted brewers in the beer 
market today.89 At the time, many small distributors carried only one brand of beer, 
and the dynamic resulted in a large power imbalance where the small wholesalers 
were at the mercy of the producer.90 Breweries were much larger and had more 
resources than distributors, which granted producers the power to choose from the 
many small distributors.91 This dynamic gave producers much influence over 
distribution contracts and franchise negotiations.92 The franchise laws statutorily 
provided contractual protections for the distribution tier against the brewers.93 
To state it simply, franchise laws are “regulations about what you can and 
cannot contract with distributors about.”94 Franchise laws dictate contractual terms 
of distribution agreements and may not be drafted around by parties to the 
contract.95 The typical franchise law provides several contractual protections to 
cure the perceived bargaining power imbalance.96 Common franchise law 
 
83.  Id.  
84.  Anhalt, supra note 55, at 163.  
85.  Id. at 163–64.  
86.  See id. at 164 (explaining that beer franchise statutes were enacted to solve the particular issue of 
imbalance of bargaining power at the time). 
87.  Id. at 174. 
88.  Steve Hindy, Free Craft Beer!, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/ 
opinion/sunday/free-craft-beer.html?_r=1 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
89. See Industry Fast Facts, supra note 46 (reporting data on the total number of breweries permitted by 
the U.S. Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, not solely craft brewers). 
90.  Hindy, supra note 88. 
91. Anhalt, supra note 55, at 174.  
92.  Id. 
93.  Id. at 164.  
94.  MOON & HOSTETTER, supra note 35, at 166. 
95.  MARC E. SORINI, BEER FRANCHISE LAW SUMMARY (2014), available at https://s3-us-west-
2.amazonaws.com/brewersassoc/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Beer-Franchise-Law-Summary.pdf (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
96.  Id. 
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protections include: termination protections, transfer protections, territorial 
protections, and procedural protections and remedies.97 
Termination protections may greatly limit a brewer’s ability to terminate 
contracts with a distributor.98 Some common termination protections include strict 
definitions of “good cause” termination, notice and cure provisions,99 and limiting 
a brewery’s ability not to renew a distribution contract.100 Transfer protections 
limit a brewer’s ability to prevent a distributor from transferring their distribution 
rights to another distribution company.101 While most states either allow or require 
distributors to notify brewers of a change of distribution rights, brewers are often 
subject to clauses where ownership change cannot be “unreasonably” withheld, 
giving brewers few rights to halt a transfer.102 Territorial protections mandate 
exclusive distribution territories for wholesalers103 where other wholesalers are not 
allowed to distribute the same brands.104 Damages and procedural protections also 
protect distributors in the event of litigation or other conflicts.105 Among these 
protections are fee-shifting statutes to the prevailing party and “reasonable 
compensation” provisions that provide for a distributor’s compensation, even for 
good cause termination.106 As further discussed below,107 these protections for 
distributors make it very difficult for brewers to terminate or amend distribution 
contracts, which can lead to disastrous consequences for breweries.108 
IV. EFFECTS OF CURRENT REGULATION 
Three-tier distribution and beer franchise laws are the mainstays of beer 
industry regulation.109 In light of its historical origins, the current regulatory 
scheme is a  well-intentioned and relatively successful mechanism for achieving 
post-Prohibition goals, such as preventing tied houses.110 However, the recent 
 
97.  Anhalt, supra note 55, at 170. 
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growth of the craft beer sector has changed the dynamic of the market and we are 
seeing that the regulations formed since Prohibition hinder rather than help the 
growth of modern craft breweries.111 A shift in the dominant paradigm from 
brewers in power to distributors in power, without the equivalent shift in the 
regulatory framework, has resulted in a system where distribution rights are being 
used to stifle and overpower craft breweries.112 
Section A delineates the benefits of the existing alcohol regulatory system that 
protects competition.113 Section B analyzes the negative ways in which the 
regulations can combine to inhibit growth and competition in the industry.114 
Section C explores the modern power imbalance in the relationships between the 
three tiers as a result of the current regulatory system.115 
A. Protecting Competition in the Market 
While this Comment is written to address the obstacles that the current 
regulatory scheme imposes on craft beer, there are still components of the existing 
regulations that aid in preventing horizontal and vertical integration and promoting 
variety and competition.116 The three-tier distribution system has succeeded in 
preventing the pre-Prohibition tied-house evils by prohibiting manufacturers from 
owning distributors or retailers.117 There are also other practical advantages to 
separating the three tiers.118 Separating production and distribution allows for a 
more economically efficient system where each tier focuses on their own business 
goals.119 Many craft brewers are small and lack the financial ability to distribute 
their own product, and distribution companies offer the resources of warehousing 
and trucks for shipping.120 This, in turn, allows the brewers to focus on brewing 
and the wholesalers to focus on distributing.121 Dedicating resources to one task 
also allows small craft brewers to reach a larger consumer pool than would 
otherwise be available through their own independent distribution companies.122 
The three-tier system has practical advantages on the retail and consumer end as 
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well.123 Because of a distributor’s capacity to market multiple brands, retailers can 
meet their demands by dealing with a few distributors that carry a wide variety of 
products, rather than dealing with each individual manufacturer.124 
Beer franchise laws also provide benefits to the beer industry.125 The 
contractual protections franchise laws provide ensure that distributors are 
independent and (mostly) free from brewer coercion and undue influence.126 This 
is particularly important to small independent craft brewers because distributors 
often carry multiple brands.127 Franchises are another restraint on Big Beer that 
allow distributors to make the necessary investments to allow craft brands to 
expand in the market.128 A further upshot is that investment in craft brands is both 
beneficial for brewers and independent distributors because a new and bigger 
market for a beer means business for both the brewer and distributor.129 
To summarize, the three-tier system and franchise laws provide for a 
middleman—the independent distributor.130 Independent distributors promote 
temperance, allow brewers to focus on brewing while reaching a larger consumer 
market, and offer retailers a larger selection of beer.131 
B. Inhibiting Craft Brewery Growth 
Though there are proven upsides to the current regulatory system, it is also the 
source of much frustration for craft breweries.132 First and foremost, the existing 
system creates barriers to entry that make it difficult for craft breweries to establish 
a place in the market.133 Although distributors provide investment to small craft 
breweries, it may still be difficult for a new brewer to secure a distribution contract 
because small and new brands do not have much value to distributors.134 The lack 
of brand recognition may make it more difficult for a distributor to sell the product, 
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and thus distributors may be unwilling to carry new brands.135 Importantly, 
distributors also require payment for the products they deliver, and small craft 
brewers may lack the financial resources to both operate a production facility and 
pay for distribution.136 A brewery’s inability to find an agreeable distribution 
contract can have dire consequences because the three-tier system was designed to 
prevent breweries from distributing their own product, with few exceptions.137 
With the current distribution scheme, it is easy for the existing laws to stifle growth 
and competition in the craft beer industry.138 
While the independence of the distribution tier is the cornerstone of this 
regulatory system, it may also cause problems.139 Because distributors are separate 
entities, many business decisions concerning products are left to the discretion of 
the distributor, if not provided for in the distribution agreement.140 These include 
decisions like advertising141 and shipping schedules.142 While shipping times are 
seemingly inconsequential, freshness is an important aspect to many craft beers, 
and distributors delivering  beers after their freshness date is a common issue.143 
Brewers have also criticized distributors for the lack of transparency in their 
relationships with other brewery clients.144 Another pertinent business decision 
distributors may make without interference or oversight is the other client-
breweries that the company decides to associate with.145 While ownership interests 
between the tiers are technically illegal, methods exist for brewers to assist or 
incentivize distributors who prioritize that brewer’s product.146 A problem arises 
in this scenario because franchise laws make it very difficult for a brewery to leave 
or break a contract with a distributor who treats it unfairly.147 To compound the 
problem, the territorial exclusivity protection that franchise law provides 
distributors makes it so that the contracted distributor is the only company with the 
rights to distribute the beer.148 In the end, a brewery may be stuck with an 
underperforming distributor because the distributor’s rights to the beer effectively 
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block a brewery from contracting with another distributor.149 
The current alcohol regulatory system is a source of consternation for small 
breweries that can either inhibit them from entering the market and expanding, or 
otherwise trample their rights in the unfortunate event they contract with an 
inadequate distributor.150 
C. The Struggle of Unequal Bargaining Power 
In today’s market, Big Beer is trying to cash in by riding the wake of the craft 
beer explosion.151 On top of craft brewery acquisitions, Big Beer is using any 
advantage it can to profit on the thriving craft beer industry.152 Their tactics include 
abusing the regulatory system to exploit its weaknesses.153 
Examples of Big Beer’s abuse of the laws are AB InBev’s ownership of its 
own distribution branch and its incentive program for “independent” 
distributors.154 AB InBev’s distributors are contractually obligated to spend a 
specified amount on advertising AB InBev products each year.155 The announced 
incentive program refunds 75% of the distributor’s advertising costs if AB InBev 
beers make up at least 98% of the distributor’s sales.156 This program is legal under 
the current system, but creates an enticement to promote AB InBev beers to the 
exclusion of other craft brands.157 
Among other things, AB InBev has a history of using its own advertisements 
to target craft brewers; ranging from its 1997 assault on Boston Beer Company of 
Sam Adams fame,158 to Super Bowl ads in both 2015 and 2016 mocking the craft 
beer culture as a whole.159 Needless to say, Big Beer companies do not care about 
the facets of craft beer that craft drinkers do: flavor, diversity, and community.160  
In the words of Tom McCormick, the Executive Director of the California Craft 
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Brewer’s Association, Big Beer is now “utilizing nearly all of the tools in their 
toolbox to capture the craft beer market.”161 
V. THE ANTITRUST ROADBLOCK 
With the recent up-tic in mergers and acquisitions of craft breweries, federal 
and state governments must take a more aggressive stance to ensure that Big Beer 
does not consume the remainder of the beer market.162 First, the federal 
government—as  it suggested it would—should examine Big Beer’s mergers and 
acquisitions under an antitrust lens with regard to anticompetitive effects.163 Then, 
states should overhaul the existing system to accommodate the new craft beer 
industry by creating a truly independent three-tier distribution system and 
revamping franchise laws to match the current state of the industry.164 
Section A looks at the application of antitrust law to the beer industry through 
the lens of past antitrust scrutiny of Big Beer mergers.165 Section B discusses how 
future applications of antitrust law could halt consolidation of the beer market.166 
A. Antitrust in the Craft Beer Industry 
Popular sentiment, as well as statistics, show that the beer industry is on its 
way to becoming a monopoly.167 While craft beer put up a valiant effort in 2016 
with a total dollar market share of 21.9%,168 four Big Beer companies comprise 
nearly 80% of the market.169 The largest of those companies, AB InBev, is blurring 
the lines of the three-tier system and flirting with vertical integration by purchasing 
distributors, and even beer rating websites.170 
A major sign that antitrust is a plausible tool for defending competition laws 
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in the market is AB InBev’s attempted acquisition of Grupo Modelo in 2013.171 
The Justice Department blocked the acquisition by instituting an antitrust lawsuit, 
citing anti-competitive motives related to price.172 The DOJ reinforced its openness 
to antitrust law in protecting the beer market again in 2016 when AB InBev 
attempted to acquire SABMiller.173 The DOJ forced AB InBev to, among other 
things, divest its stake in MillerCoors before the transaction could continue.174 In 
a statement following the suit, the DOJ also promised to further scrutinize any 
future acquisitions by AB InBev.175 Following the completed transaction, over 90 
of the beer market is controlled by AB InBev and MillerCoors in most local 
markets.176 
Several key laws empower the federal government to enforce antitrust laws.177 
The Sherman Act comprehensively outlaws monopolization and attempted 
monopolization; the Federal Trade Commission Act outlaws unfair methods of 
competition; and the Clayton Act prohibits transactions that may substantially 
lessen “competition, or tend to create a monopoly.”178 The two antitrust suits 
mentioned above were filed under the Section 7 of the Clayton Act based on the 
apparent anticompetitive effects of the mergers.179 
To halt the further consolidation of the U.S. beer market, the DOJ should 
review transactions of all Big Beer conglomerates, not just AB InBev, under a 
strict antitrust analysis.180 Focusing on the local anticompetitive effects of 
acquisitions in regional markets would prevent consolidation.181 Similar to the 
DOJ’s involvement in the AB InBev-SABMiller transaction, focusing on the 
effects of an acquisition on a regional level can show that the transaction may 
substantially lessen competition in a given area.182 This is further evidenced by the 
over 90% control by Big Beer in some local markets.183 
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If the DOJ upholds its promise to further review any of AB InBev’s craft 
brewery acquisitions, it would promote competition and variety in the 
marketplace.184 Halting the spread of Big Beer into the craft beer sector would not 
only allow craft beer to continue to thrive but would afford it the opportunity to 
grow un-harassed by the pressures of encroaching Big Beer.185 
Examining the factors the DOJ relied on in its two previous antitrust suits 
against AB InBev gives insight into how antitrust laws can be used to protect 
competition in the beer market.186 In both cases, the DOJ primarily relied on the 
same factors in deciding whether to initiate litigation because the acquisition would 
substantially lessen competition.187 The DOJ cited four negative impacts the 
proposed acquisition would have on the beer market: price control, concentration 
of the market, elimination of head-to-head competition, and distribution effects.188 
1. Price Control 
Through a long chain of connected factual findings, the DOJ showed that the 
merger of Big Beer companies affects the prices of beers both in regional markets 
and across the nation.189 Beer is different enough from other types of alcohol that 
a monopolist in the beer market would be able to raise prices without the risk of 
losing customers to another alcohol market.190 Demand in the beer market is also 
location driven, thus customers are unlikely to venture to other geographical 
markets due to price hikes.191 
Furthermore, brewers categorize beers in the market according to price: sub-
premium, premium, and high-end.192 The “high-end” segment generally consists 
of imported and small craft beers, while other domestic beers make up the lower 
tiers.193 Large breweries attempt to maintain price gaps between beers in each tier 
to limit competition between the segments.194 It is in this aspect that competition, 
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especially from the high-end segment, is an important constraint on market 
prices.195 
Big Beer typically employs national pricing strategies and AB InBev, world’s 
largest brewer, leads the way.196 As the industry leader, AB InBev announces its 
price increases for the upcoming year using an intentionally transparent plan in 
attempt to get other competing brands to follow.197 Notably, MillerCoors, the 
nation’s second-largest brewery, has routinely followed the same plan.198 As Big 
Beer companies raise their prices, high-end and craft brewers become a threat 
through “price gap compression.”199 Because Big Beer deals mostly in the sub-
premium and premium tiers, as the price gap between premium and high-end 
lessens, consumers are more likely to switch to high-end beers.200 In response to 
this price constraint, one of AB InBev’s stated goals is to “slow the volume trend 
of High End Segment and [not] let the industry transform.”201 
To summarize the chain of findings, the isolation of regional beer markets 
from outside competition allows price increases without the loss of business and a 
high variety of prices between markets.202 Competition from independent, high-
end and craft breweries is one of the few and important restraints on AB InBev’s 
unilateral price-setting power.203 The DOJ relied on the likely anticompetitive 
effects and resulting price hike in blocking the AB InBev-SABMiller merger.204 
2. Market Concentration 
The DOJ used market concentration as an indicator of “the level of competitive 
vigor in a market and the likely effects of a merger.”205 It reasoned, “[t]he more 
concentrated a market, and the more a transaction would increase concentration in 
a market, the more likely it is that the transaction would result in harm to 
consumers by meaningfully reducing competition.”206 Under the DOJ’s antitrust 
metrics, the U.S. beer market is considered highly concentrated.207 
In both of the DOJ’s antitrust suits against AB InBev, the agency found that 
the mergers would significantly increase the concentration in each relevant 
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regional market.208 Under the Clayton Act, the mergers and acquisitions were 
found presumptively anticompetitive based on the existing market concentration 
and the significant increase in concentration that would follow.209 Practically 
speaking, the DOJ examined the business’ total post-merger market share to 
determine the anticompetitive effects and influence on the regional market.210 
3. Elimination of Head-to-Head Competition 
In the Complaints of both antitrust suits, the DOJ reasoned that eliminating 
head-to-head competition would substantially lessen competition in both national 
and regional markets, in violation of the Clayton Act.211 The DOJ’s analysis here 
is similar to that of market concentration, but it examines the actual post-merger 
effects of consolidation and the elimination of competition,212 as opposed to merely 
creating a presumption from statistics.213 In practice, the consolidation will result 
in two breweries under the direction of one organization, AB InBev.214 The DOJ 
stated the lack of head-to-head competition would negatively impact beer prices, 
product innovation, and consumer choice.215 
Where two competing companies existed previously, the common ownership 
of the two brands will likely result in a unilateral price increase under AB InBev’s 
price control plan.216 Further, the merger would stifle innovation because AB 
InBev effectively owns the competing brand and has no incentive to develop a 
competing product.217 This is exemplified in the Grupo Modelo suit, where the 
DOJ concluded that if the merger were to occur, AB InBev would lack the 
economic motive to develop a competing Mexican-style craft brand.218 Lastly, less 
competition and innovation results in a smaller variety of products in the market.219 
Ultimately, the DOJ considered the effects of the impending elimination of head-
to-head competition on price, choice, and innovation in instituting the antitrust 
suits.220 
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4. Limiting Distribution 
In the antitrust suit against AB InBev and MillerCoors, the DOJ examined the 
merger’s anticompetitive effect of limiting high-end and craft distribution.221 In 
2014, over 85% of the beer sold in the United States was distributed by a 
MillerCoors affiliated wholesaler, AB InBev affiliated wholesaler, or a distributor 
owned by AB InBev.222 Furthermore, AB InBev has multiple financial incentive 
programs and contractual provisions meant to promote exclusivity with 
distributors that sell AB InBev beer.223 AB InBev beers account for almost 90% of 
the volume of sales of an affiliated distributor.224 The remaining sales volume is 
composed of high-end craft brewers with limited sales and high operating costs.225 
If AB InBev acquires MillerCoors, it is likely that AB InBev would use the 
same anticompetitive tactics to promote exclusivity of MillerCoors beer.226 The 
two largest brewing companies would promote exclusivity of their brands to the 
detriment of competing high-end brands.227 While distribution seems like a topic 
better left for Congress, the anticompetitive effects of a merger on distribution are 
but one factor the DOJ considered in bringing the antitrust suit.228 
B. Why Antitrust is a Viable Solution 
Both cases mentioned above use nearly identical solutions to prevent the 
anticompetitive effects of the mergers.229 The DOJ required the acquiring company 
to divest assets and ownership interests in portions of the businesses operating in 
the U.S.230 The remedy attempts to maintain and encourage competition in the U.S. 
beer market by ensuring that the divested businesses remain viable competitors in 
the market.231 Preserving the independence of breweries promotes competition and 
acts as an important price constraint on Big Beer.232 The DOJ also imposed certain 
conditions on AB InBev’s distribution incentives and practices to limit the negative 
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impact on high-end beers.233   
Lastly, the DOJ required AB InBev to provide advanced notice of any plan to 
acquire a brewer or distributor to the Antitrust Division to determine whether the 
acquisition is likely to substantially lessen competition.234 While the two antitrust 
suits were instigated against Big Beer companies, this provision applies generally 
to breweries of any size.235 The lack of limiting language shows that the DOJ is 
open to performing the antitrust analysis on acquisitions of any size, including craft 
breweries.236 
VI. STATE REGULATIONS 
Federal antitrust law is only the first step in preventing market 
consolidation.237 States should still overhaul the existing regulatory system to 
accommodate the new craft beer industry by creating a truly independent three-tier 
distribution system and revamping franchise laws to match the current state of the 
industry.238 Section A discusses the necessity of revising three-tier laws to fit 
today’s market.239 Section B explores methods of amending franchise laws to fit 
the modern three-tier model.240 
A. Retain and Adjust the Three-Tier System 
The three-tier distribution system plays a critical role in leveling the playing 
field for breweries, as well as ensuring that we do not revert back to the old ways 
of the tier-house.241 The three-tier distribution system is imperative to protecting 
the interests of craft beer and promoting variety and competition, while also 
keeping Big Beer at bay.242 Nevertheless, the three-tier system should be 
reconfigured so that the middle tier—distributors—are truly independent.243 
The current three-tier distribution system allows intermixing of brewers and 
distributors, which borders on vertical integration.244 While AB InBev’s above 
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mentioned distributor incentive program245 was eventually blocked for 
anticompetitive effects as part of the DOJ’s review of the SABMiller acquisition, 
it is an otherwise legal program.246 Although the incentive program was prohibited 
in this instance, the piecemeal review process would be ineffective in catching all 
instances of this type of incentive conduct.247 
While the three-tier system is imperative to promoting competition and should 
not be repealed, states should apply more strict statutes regulating relationships 
between the three-tiers, especially brewers and distributors.248 Disallowing any 
financial interest, either directly or indirectly, would further the goal of having a 
true independent distributor who is free from coercion by large brewers.249 The 
freedom to act independent from coercion or undue influence from large corporate 
brewers would remove another entrance barrier to the craft beer market and give 
small breweries the opportunity to expand, with the help of distributors.250 
B. One Size Franchise Law Does Not Fit All 
While franchise laws still protect distributors against abuses from large 
brewers, the system is antiquated and does more harm than good by stifling small 
craft brewers.251 Today, large brewers in Big Beer still hold enough power to 
represent similar threats, but distributors have decreased in number and increased 
in size to gain some of their own power.252 Now, small brewers are at a 
disadvantaged tier when it comes to bargaining power, and the laws should reflect 
this shift.253 
The simplest solution is to provide an outright exemption to the beer franchise 
laws for brewers who produce below a certain volume.254 The exemption would 
allow small brewers the flexibility to modify terms or change distributors to 
receive the best possible access to the market.255 If a state finds a complete 
exemption too extreme, following an approach like the state of New York by 
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creating special carveouts in the franchise laws may be more appropriate.256 New 
York’s carveout for small brewers allows them to terminate a contract by paying 
fair market value for distribution rights, which is less restrictive than traditional 
franchise laws and cheaper than litigation.257 
Another solution may be to relax the laws on direct-sale and self-
distribution.258 While some states have already allowed direct-sale, self-
distribution, or both, ensuring that all small breweries have the opportunity to sell 
their own product makes establishing themselves in the market place an easier 
feat.259 Allowing breweries to sell their own products solves the issue of 
distributors’ lack of interest in new brewers with little value.260 Exempting only 
small brewers will allow them to establish themselves in the market and 
subsequently move on to third-party independent distributors, becoming a 
functioning member of the three-tier system.261 
Although large brewing companies present threats the alcohol regulatory 
system was designed to safeguard against, small craft breweries break the mold.262 
Exempting small brewers from the three-tiered scheme and beer franchise laws 
alleviates regulatory suppression and affords them a chance to grow.263 Providing 
an exemption to the regulatory system for craft brewers is vital to the survival of 
the industry.264 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The trend of craft breweries selling to Big Beer is a direct result of the 
American alcohol regulatory scheme.265 The existing three-tier distribution system 
and beer franchise laws have become dated and out of touch with the realities of 
the rapid growth of small craft breweries in the current market.266 The antiquated 
system is advantageous to Big Beer conglomerates, who utilize any benefit they 
can to retain a large market share.267 
In order to ensure the survival of the craft beer industry and promote its culture 
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of variety, diversity, and competition, both federal and state governments must 
work to prevent the monopolization and consolidation of the market.268 To halt the 
increasing consolidation of the market, the DOJ should utilize existing antitrust 
measures that it has recently applied to review and scrutinize transactions of Big 
Beer conglomerates for monopolistic or anticompetitive effects.269 In the 
meantime, states should revamp their own regulatory systems to give small craft 
brewers an opportunity to succeed.270 Retaining and even tightening down on the 
three-tier system to eliminate as much intermingling of the tiers as possible ensures 
the distribution tier is truly neutral and independent—vital qualities to guarantee 
that craft brewers are able to compete effectively and each retailer has a large 
variety of beer.271 Lastly, exempting small brewers from the distribution and 
franchise laws and allowing them to sell their own products would eliminate the 
inherent advantage given to large brewers and distributors.272 While the 
distribution laws are slowly evolving to accommodate the modern industry,273 
moving on from the post-Prohibition era regulations in a manner that benefits the 
growing craft beer sector will ensure that the beer industry continues to be 
competitive and provides consumers with a wide variety of their favorite drink.274 
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